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1Abstract
Cross section data suggest that the relationship between age and hourly earnings is
an inverted-U shape. Evidence from panel data does not necessarily confirm this
finding suggesting that older workers may not experience a reduction in earnings at
the end of their working life. In this paper we use panel data on males for Great
Britain in order to examine why the two types of data provide conflicting
conclusions. Concentrating on the over 50s, several hypotheses are examined:
overlapping cohorts, job tenure, job-changing, labour supply behaviour and
selectivity bias. Cohort and individual fixed effects partly explain the divergent
conclusions. However, for fully, year-on-year employed individuals, there is no
evidence of earnings decline at the end of working life. We find no role for selectivity
due to retirement, although shorter working hours or partial retirement along with
job-changing late in life do provide an explanation for why hourly earnings decline
for certain older workers. We find no evidence that the process of ageing itself leads
to lower earnings as suggested by the cross section profile.
Keywords : age-earnings profile; older workers; labour supply; cohort effects.
JEL classification : J.3, J.14, J.24.
2The labour market for older workers has attracted increased interest in recent years.
From a policy-maker’s point of view, the issues of pension finance and of the costs of
providing health care in the face of an aging population have raised serious
questions concerning the duration of working life. Most countries with contribution-
based state pension systems have already increased the minimum retirement age and
taken measures to deal with the problem of financing longer periods of retirement. In
contrast, participation rates among the over 50s have significantly declined with age
in the last thirty years, as individuals begin to leave the labour force and enter
retirement earlier1.  For example, in Great Britain in the 2000s, the participation rate
falls from over 80% among 50 to 54 year olds to around 70% for the 55 to 59 age
group, and less than 50% for those aged 60 to 64.  The figures are even more striking
for France (around 80%, less than 60% and around 15%, respectively). There is also
evidence in some countries that older workers may be subject to discrimination in
recruitment and retention. Each of these mechanisms will involve lower pension
contributions thereby exacerbating the financing problem.
Related to these stylised facts is the cross section observation that average earnings
are lower for individuals who are at the end of their working life – or put another
way, that the age-earnings profile has an inverted U shape. There are various
implications for policy if individuals’ earnings do in fact decline as they become
older. First there could be an incentive to reduce labour supply as leisure becomes
relatively less expensive. This mechanism will also interact with the prospect of
increased non-labour income through different forms of pension provision which are
possible in certain countries. Second, if the monthly earnings of older workers
decline, pension contributions (when set as a proportion of earnings) will follow.
This paper addresses the issue of whether hourly earnings do in fact decline as a
consequence of ageing. In a typical earnings equation, the age-earnings profile is
specified as a smooth, concave function and usually reaches a maximum during a
typical individual’s working life – generally in the 40 to 50 age interval (see Figure
1a). This concave relation is predicted by human capital theory and is borne out in
the cross section analysis of earnings differences2. Investments in human capital will
normally decline towards the end of a working life since they are less profitable.
Furthermore, investments made at an earlier age will be depreciating and
1 There is some evidence that this may be starting to change as a consequence of recent pension
reforms.
2 Murphy and Welch (1996) explore various polynomial forms for this relation and categorically reject
the quadratic specification that was derived and applied by Mincer (1974), and adopted widely since.
3productivity will start to diminish. The consequence is a slowdown and eventual
decrease in earnings with age, as depicted in Figure 1b. Several studies at the firm
level have attempted to assess the importance of productivity decline among older
workers (for example Aubert and Crépon, 2003 for France, and Van Ours and
Stoeldraijer, 2010 for the Netherlands).
Studies that use panel data on individuals however find that earnings do not
necessarily decline with age at the individual level (see for example, Johnson and
Neumark, 1996 for the US and Myck, 2010 for Great Britain and Germany). This is at
odds with the predictions of human capital theory; productivity may not decline at
the end of an individual’s working life (see for example, Hægeland and Klette
(1999)). This outcome is consistent with theories of incentive contracts which show
that wage growth is possible in absence of human capital growth. For instance,
Lazear’s (1981) model or deferred compensation contract predicts that the earnings
increase over a career with the same employer. Older workers receive higher wages
in order to address the problem of moral hazard and imperfect information. In this
model, firms use seniority wages to motivate workers to supply a higher level of
effort and to avoid leaving the company as retirement approaches. Elsewhere,
empirical studies suggest that older workers are appreciated in the world of work for
their professional skills, experience and dedication. Several studies indicate that non
cognitive or social skills are as important as cognitive skills and are associated with
wage premia (Heckman and Rubinstein (2001), Postlewaite and Silverman (2006)).
An individual’s personality (behaviour, motivation, sociability, leadership) is valued
by employers and contributes to raising individual earnings. All these conflicting
elements leave open the question of how the cross-section regularity can be
explained.
An alternative explanation may be related to the dynamics of the working
population. Each cohort may have a monotonic upward-sloping earnings profile but
overtakes the preceding cohort. A cross section will pick up members of different
cohorts at each age rather trace the life-cycle earnings profile of a typical individual
(as in Figure 1c). A further possibility is that earnings fall for a subset of older
workers who change employer or job status in the latter part of their working life.
This may be planned and therefore voluntary, as suggested by Casanova (2012), or
involuntary if firms use age as a criterion for lay-offs and displaced older workers
subsequently take lower paid jobs. Finally, given the substantial decline in the
participation rate from the age of 50 onwards noted above, there may be a selectivity
4bias in earnings regressions if those leaving the labour force are also those who tend
to have higher earnings potential (see Figure 1d).
In this paper we explore these different possibilities using panel data on males for
Great Britain. The first section describes the data source used and the definitions of
earnings that are used in the subsequent analysis. The following section contains a
descriptive analysis of earnings profiles by age and by cohort. The third section
exploits the panel dimension of the data and looks at the age-earnings profile using a
fixed effects specification. We examine the role of tenure, job mobility and partial
retirement as possible explanations of the observed downturn in hourly earnings for
older workers in cross section data. The penultimate section assesses the role of early
retirement and other selection mechanisms that may affect the shape of the age-
earnings profile, while the final section draws together our conclusions.
1. Earnings and the British Household Panel Survey
The data used are taken from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) for the
period 1991 to 2007. We are primarily interested in older workers who are defined as
those aged 50 or over, and so the main sample used are males born between 1936 and
1956. Each individual born between these two years will have been observed at some
point or all their life in the survey while they are in the older workers category (aged
50 or over). The sample is truncated at the age of 65. Since this sample of the panel is
not balanced, the numbers of individuals in each age interval will differ according to
the cohorts that are followed through the period 1991 to 2007. An idea of the
variability of the sample numbers is presented in Table 1 for all cohorts of males of
working age. At the beginning of the panel survey in 1991, some 3,260 males are
aged between 16 and 65, and this number declines over the period of the operation of
the survey to around 1,860. Exits exceed entrants and the sample size diminishes.
However, given the dynamics of the population, the size of main sample used, which
is the 50 to 65 age group is more stable and varies between 600 and 800 per year.
In cross section analysis, a snapshot is taken of an individual’s labour market
situation at particular point in his life-cycle. A significant proportion of individuals
will not declare current earnings due to non participation or non employment, and
this sub-group may not have the same observed or unobserved characteristics as the
overall population of working age. In a panel survey, individuals may move between
different types of labour status, and therefore will not provide data for a continuous
5earnings profile. Furthermore, many individuals are unable to declare an hourly
wage or monthly earnings at the time of interview, but can declare earnings for the
previous twelve month period. As in many surveys, respondents in the BHPS are
asked to specify usual earnings.
Three concepts of gross hourly earnings3 with variable response rates are used:
(a) current hourly earnings
(b) usual hourly earnings if these differ from current earnings
(c) hourly earnings imputed from annual earnings
Since earnings are being compared over a long time span, the figures used are
converted into real terms using a price deflator. The latter indicates that prices
increased by 36% between 1991 and 2007, at an average rate of 1.85% per annum.
There is an interesting issue concerning education level in this context. The older
section of labour force in the year 2000 will contain persons born before 1950 (figures
by cohort are given in Table 2). At this time, and until the 1960s, only a minority of
individuals would remain in education after the age of 16. The minimum school
leaving age was 14 and the options for post-school training were relatively limited
for these individuals. For those born prior to 1940, a majority had no formal
qualifications, and less than 8% went to university. Of those born between 1950 and
1955, only a fifth had no formal educational qualifications, while 62% finished
education with GCSE O- or A-levels, with 16% going to university. It therefore is
difficult to examine differences in earnings between cohorts for a given education
level across a period in which qualifications and access to education changed so
dramatically.
2. Cross section and cohort age-earnings profiles
Figure 3 shows the cross sectional hourly earnings profiles for 1991 and 2007. The
age-average hourly earnings relation in both cases has the typical concave inverted
U-shape found in cross section data. Average earnings of those aged over 60 are
around those earned by those in the 25 to 30 year age group. In the final year, 2007,
3 In each case the respondent is asked to declare the amount earned and the corresponding number of
hours worked. Hourly earnings are obtained by dividing total earnings by total hours declared.
6there appears to be more variation in the 40 to 50 age interval. For 1991, the
maximum is situated on a plateau somewhere between the ages of 30 and 50, and
average earnings appear to be lower for those aged 50 and over.  For 2007, higher
dispersion means that the profile is not very smooth and the observed maximum
actually looks like an outlier and occurs at the age of 48. However it is not clear
whether earnings in the age interval 45 to 50 are always higher than in the 40 to 45
interval. Since earnings are expressed in real terms, the positions of the profiles are
comparable. The introduction of the national minimum wage in 1999 will have
affected the starting point for the earnings of those entering the labour market from
that year onwards.
The same age profiles are presented for real annual earnings in Figure 4. Obviously
annual earnings include a labour supply dimension, and do not simply reflect the
price of an individual’s labour services. However, in consumption terms, total
earnings are the relevant variable for decision-making and in terms of the well-being
it is relevant to examine total rather than hourly earnings. The annual earnings
profiles fall away in a more pronounced manner than for hourly earnings showing
that labour supply is an important component.
This observed inverted U-shaped profile could be the consequence of aging itself, as
the human capital model suggests. However, it may simply be a statistical artefact
found in cross section data and result from the tendency of successive generations or
cohorts to earn more on average the preceding ones. This over-taking phenomenon
can in theory generate a concave inverted U-shaped age-earnings profile in cross
section data. Upward-sloping cohort age-earnings profiles are reproduced in a
stylised manner in Figure 1c.  In a cross section each cohort is observed at a particular
point in its life-cycle, and the data will take the form of a series of clusters, one per
cohort. When these are used to produce the cross section profile, in the case of over-
taking there will be a concave inverted U-shape while the age-earnings profile for the
cohort itself may never decline.
Using the same data source as for the cross section profiles in Figure 3, the cohort
age-average earnings profiles are presented in Figures 5a and 5b. These bear out the
notion of overtaking, and the slope of the cohort earnings profile does not in general
become negative from around the age of 50 as the cross section data would suggest.
In fact there is very little evidence to suggest that the slope becomes negative –
except for the very oldest cohorts born before 1945, and then from around the age of
55. The age-earnings profiles by cohort present a very different picture from the cross
7section relationship. A fuller analysis using an age-period-cohort decomposition is
undertaken in Charni (2015).
3. Individual earnings of males – cross section versus panel data
The previous section suggests that cohort effects may be a key element in explaining
the inverted U-shape of the age-earnings profile observed in cross section data. In
this section, individual earnings profiles for males are examined using panel data
methods. This form of data also allows an individual effect to be taken into account
which will contain the effect of cohort membership plus other time invariant
individual-specific characteristics:
  itititiit uAgxw   (3)
The equation for the logarithm of earnings ( itw ) contains individual effects ( i ), time
effects ( t ), a vector of time invariant characteristics ( ix ) and a function of age ( itA ).
In what follows only the part of the profile for the group aged 50 or over is
considered. The sample used here is an unbalanced panel, due to absences at the
time of the survey, non-declaration of earnings due to current labour market status,
early retirement and most importantly in terms of the numbers concerned, truncation
at the age of 65. For example, an individual born in 1940 will no longer be in the
sample from 2006 onward.
One of the first studies of the age-earnings profile using a lengthy panel survey was
undertaken by Johnson and Neumark (1996). In order to allow for the most flexible
form of relation between the two variables, they define a dummy variable for each
year of age such that
1aitd if individual i is aged a years or older in year t and 0aitd otherwise
These are used in a panel data earnings equation of the following form :
itaita
A
a
itiit udxw  



(4)
The individual components ( i ) are treated as fixed (rather than random) effects and,
along with the vector of time invariant characteristics ( ix ), will be swept out when
estimating the parameters of interest ( a ). The coefficient on each dummy gives the
8marginal change in (log) earnings at that age. The sum of these coefficients up to a
given age gives the total effect of age on earnings at that point in the life cycle. Since
only the part of the profile for the group aged 50 or over is considered, the constant
term along with the means other explanatory variables will determine the reference
for someone aged 49. In order to have larger sample numbers per cell, the dummies
are defined in two year steps – 50 or over, 52 or over and so forth4.
To begin with, the pooled estimates (that is, ignoring the individual fixed effects) are
presented. These equations are estimated using the three definitions of hourly
earnings mentioned above and include controls for education, marital status, family
and personal background and year dummies. The results, presented in Table 3,
indicate that there is evidence of declining earnings at the end of an individual’s
career, but only from the age of 58. The estimates based on all definitions of hourly
earnings show the same phenomenon: a statistically significant decline in average
earnings that begins at the age of 58 and continues to decline thereafter. This is at
odds with the cross section profile since any earnings decline occurs very late in
working life.
Based on current and usual hourly earnings, someone aged 58 or over will earn 4.7%
less than someone aged 56; an individual aged 60 or over, more than 11% less than
one aged 59, and a further 7% from the age of 62. The estimates based on dividing
annual earnings by annual hours of work are less clear-cut but still show that hourly
earnings decline: the size of the decline is more pronounced (7% from the age of 58)
and the coefficient on the dummy for aged 62 or over is not significant at the 5%
level. The pooled estimates therefore indicate declining earnings for older workers
after from the age of 58 onwards.
Estimating the age-earnings profile using fixed effects amounts to replacing any
time-invariant influence on earnings with an individual-specific constant. This has
the advantage of bringing into the model any variable or influence that affects
earnings that remains unchanged over time, including factors that have not or cannot
be observed. This is achieved at the price of aggregating these influences into a single
coefficient and not being able to identify their separate effects. Interestingly in the
current context, any cohort effects will be included in the fixed effect. The results are
presented in Table 4.
4 This also enables the effect of age to be identified separately from that of cohort membership or
period effects common to all cohorts – see Browning et al (2013).
9As in the pooled regressions, the age-earnings profiles corrected for fixed effects still
indicate that earnings decline at the end of a working life. However, this occurs a
little later - from 60 onwards compared to 58 according to the pooled estimates -
except in the case of hourly earnings imputed from annual earnings, when the
decline occurs from the age of 62. The age effects on earnings are however of much
smaller magnitude. The extent of the decline is 3.7% from the age of 60 onwards
when we use usual hourly earnings or the definition derived from annual earnings,
and 4.7% for the current hourly earnings and does not decline any further thereafter.
Thus while the fixed effect will pick up cohort effects, there is still a downturn
detected in hourly earnings in the typical age-earnings profile for males. It is worth
noting that this effect is only just significant at the conventional 5% level.
4. Tenure and job-changing
The estimated decline in earnings for older workers could be the consequence of
events that occur later in life rather than the effect of ageing itself, such job-changing
– voluntary or not – and labour supply behaviour. Johnson and Neumark (1996) for
example compare three categories of employee: career, continuous and non-retirees.
The first group are those who are in the job with the longest tenure (with the same
employer) in their career. Continuous workers are those who remain in employment
(even though they may change employer) throughout the sample period or until the
age of 65, whichever occurs first. These individuals are able to declare earnings in
each year of the survey. Non-retirees are those who may not always be employed in
each year over the sample period but who do not consider themselves to be retired
when not in work.
Because the fact of not working during a certain period involves a loss in labour
market experience and may affect the evolution of earnings, we re-estimate the
equation on a subsample of ‘continuous’ workers who are defined as those who
remain employed over the survey. The estimates are presented  in column (2) of
Table 5 for usual hourly earnings and are qualitatively similar as those obtained
using fixed effects in column (1) except that there is no evidence of a decline in
earnings after the age of 60 (the coefficient is smaller in absolute value and not
significant even at the 10% level). The decrease in earnings at older ages may
therefore be result of a bias due to certain individuals who do not work during all the
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period (this was illustrated in a stylised fashion in Figure 1d). The earnings profile
for older workers who remain employed seems to be flat.
In columns 3, 4 and 5 of Table 5, we analyse the incidence of specific human capital
on earnings by distinguishing between job stayers and job movers because the wage
profile would be expected to be different. Because the transition between two jobs
could be involuntary, we also differentiate two forms of job transition: voluntary and
involuntary mobility, where the latter is defined as being a job change involving an
intervening spell of unemployment.
4.1 Stayers - the effect of tenure on earnings
There may be a link to the role played by human capital on evolution of earnings, in
particular the returns of specific human capital. Since the latter can be approximated
by job tenure where human capital is accumulated through work experience with the
same employer, and is not transferable between firms, there is a cost to switching
employers due to the loss of the returns to this type of human capital. The earnings
equation for a worker can be rewritten in the following way:
ititaita
A
a
itiit uTdxw  



(5)
where itT is tenure with the current employer. As expected, tenure has a positive
effect on usual hourly earnings (Table 5, column 3). Staying one additional year with
the same employer leads to an increase of 0.6% in the real hourly wage. While there
is some debate about what this effect means, it is present. One possibility is that
longer job tenure increases the stock of specific human capital which entails higher
productivity to the firm and leads to higher earnings. Abraham and Farber (1987)
argue that longer tenures reflect high quality matches between employer and
employee, producing rents that are shared in terms of earnings premia. In this
equation there is still a significant negative coefficient on the dummy for those aged
60 or over suggesting that other things equal earnings decline by 3.5%, although
there is some uncertainty concerning its importance (it is not significant at the 5%
level).
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4.2 Movers and the consequences of job mobility
An alternative way of looking at this is to examine the earnings consequences of
changing job late in life. This could constitute an explanation for the decline in
earnings observed in cross-section and picked up partially in panel data. Older
workers may decide to change job/employer in order to work less (part-time work or
less taxing work), or possibly for jobs with higher pay. They may also be laid-off and
find alternative employment with lower pay. We define job mobility as any
transition from one employer to another and we want to estimate the effects of
changing employer on earnings. We use the information of past employment spells
to construct a job mobility variable and distinguish two cases: voluntary mobility
which is characterised by direct transition between jobs, and involuntary mobility
which involves a spell of unemployment between jobs.
The earnings equation in this case takes the following form:
itititaita
A
a
itiit uUEdxw  

21 

(6)
where itE is a dummy variable for voluntary job change and itU a dummy when the
transition involves a spell of unemployment which is considered to be involuntary
mobility. Changing employer/firm after the age of 50 appears to have negative
influence on earnings growth. Workers who voluntarily decide to change
jobs/employers late in life earn 10.3% less than someone who does not (column 4).
One explanation could be the loss of returns to specific human capital accumulated
through work experience (and which is not transferable between firms).
Alternatively, there may be a compensating differential due to non-wage
characteristics of the new job obtained. Mobility between jobs has a negative impact
on hourly earnings and this transition can explain why we observe an earnings
decrease at the age of 60 in the column (1). In all, if we take into account all these
facts, the earnings profile for older workers is relatively flat.
Job mobility involving a spell of unemployment entails substantial negative returns
to hourly earnings. The fixed effects estimates show that involuntary job separations
lead to earnings losses of 29% (column 4). We have also reported the impact of length
of time spent unemployed (measured in months) which replaces the dummy variable
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itU in equation. Thus, for example, a worker who has been unemployment for a year
has hourly earnings that are 12% lower than a worker who experienced no spell of
unemployment (column 5). This could be associated with the loss of human capital
or lack of motivation and drive caused by a spell of unemployment. In this situation,
the worker is doubly punished by the market. Firstly, the wage is negatively affected
because of the loss of returns to specific human capital and secondly, by the signal
sent out by the fact of being out of work, which may result in lower productivity
compared to an individual who is able switch directly between two jobs. The results
show that the growth of earnings is positive and increases until the age of 60. In
contrast to the previous case where we do not differentiate individuals who interrupt
their career from others, a small decline in earnings is observed later in life and from
the age of 60, although this is not significant at the 5% level.
4.3 Labour supply decisions
Another factor could be the impact of ‘partial retirement’. There is evidence that
‘partial retirement’ plays a role in the decline of earnings at older age especially in
the United States (Gustmann and Steinmeier, 1985; Johnson and Neumark, 1996;
French, 2005; Casanova, 2012). The hourly wage of a worker who transits into partial
retirement, characterised by a decrease in the number of hours worked, declines.
Indeed, older workers do not necessarily go directly into retirement but instead
choose to switch to part-time work in order to prepare a smooth transition into
retirement and such jobs are usually lower paid than full-time positions. The sample
used in the results of the basic model (column (1)) includes observations from
workers who switch into part-time work. So, declines in wages could be attributable
to a shift into this status rather than being due to age. To see whether the downward-
sloping hourly earnings profile is determined by the transition into part-time jobs or
jobs less paid just before the retirement, we introduce a variable representing ‘partial
retirement’ for workers who transit from full-time work to part-time work5. The fixed
effects estimates are presented in column (5).
5 As a robustness check, we estimate the model using two definitions for ‘partial retirement’:
employees who work i) less than 35 hours per week or ii) less than 30 hours per week. The results
remain similar.
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The estimated coefficients imply a 26% decline in the hourly wage for workers who
reduce their labour supply. This is similar to the results of Casanova (2012) who finds
a 32% decrease in hourly wages in the United States. At the same time, none of the
age dummies are significantly negative and the profile remains flat after the age of
54. The negative impact of this move into partial retirement could therefore explain
the decline associated with age identified in the basic specification. Once we control
for this labour supply decision, there is no clear evidence of earnings decline at the
end of working life as a result of the process of aging.
5. Selectivity effects in panel data
A final issue to be examined is the role of selectivity. In most analyses of earnings
differences, the issue of bias due to endogeneity is a key concern. In the current case,
the main issue for older workers will be the consequences of withdrawing
completely from the labour force. While state pensions are paid in Great Britain from
a minimum defined retirement age (for males 65), there exist other forms of
replacement income from occupational pension funds, capital and housing wealth.
Choices concerning retirement mean that labour supply decisions may have an
impact on the estimated age-earnings profile if those with higher earnings tend to
move into retirement at a faster rate, leaving a non-random sample of earners from
which econometric estimates can be obtained. This is illustrated in a stylised fashion
in Figure 1d. The participation issue is a key facet of the labour force behaviour of
older workers, since it is high (85%) at the age of 50 and declines steadily up to the
age of 59 (60%), decreases noticeably around the age of 60 (to 50%) and trends
downwards through to the state retirement age of 65 (see Figure 2).
This selectivity issue in relation to retirement has recently been examined for the
United States in unpublished papers by Casanova (2012) and Rupert and Zanella
(2012). The approach essentially involves estimating panel data earnings equations
with the inclusion of a Heckman-type selectivity correction term obtained using a
first stage probit model of participation to generate inverse Mills ratios. The
procedure is not as straightforward as the cross section case since with panel data,
individuals may move in and out of employment or the labour force, declaring a
wage one year and not another. This complicates the selectivity correction procedure
as Wooldridge (1995, 2002) explains.
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In line with Casanova (2012) and Rupert and Zanella (2012), we follow the
Wooldridge approach to taking into account the potential impact of selection bias6.
The method tests and corrects for sample selection in fixed effects models estimated
using panel data. To allow for the correlation between unobserved individual effects
and explanatory variables, Wooldridge makes the assumption of ‘Mean Conditional
Independence’. Unobserved individual eﬀects are speciﬁed as a linear projection on
the observable variables and selection bias in the presence of individual fixed-effects
can be controlled for.
The empirical specification of the log earnings equation is as follows :
itiitiit ZXw   11* for Ttni ,.....,1,....,1  and (7)
where i refers to individuals and t to time periods. itX 1 is a vector of time-varying
regressors which includes age and additional over-identifying variables, iZ1 is a
vector of time-constant regressors, i is an unobserved individual effect and it is the
idiosyncratic error term.
The participation selection equation takes the following form:
itititit vZXs  2212*  for Ttni ,.....,1,....,1  and (8)
If 0* its , *itit ww  and the participation dummy, 1itS . Earnings are not observed
when 0* its in which case the participation dummy 0itS . In fact we study two
separate cases, in which the selection equations are of the same form but the
dependent variable is based on (a) current economic activity where 1itS if the
individual is working and declares a usual hourly wage and 0 if the respondent is
not working, and (b) an observed annual hourly wage, where 1itS if annual
earnings are observed and 0 otherwise, respectively. The selection equation includes
vectors of time-varying and time-invariant regressors present in the earnings
equation, itX 2 , and the time-varying identifying variables excluded from the
earnings equation, itZ 2 . itv is an unobserved error term.
Wooldridge (1995) describes a test for selection bias in a panel data context. This
requires that an Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) be obtained from pooled probit estimation
6 There are other approaches to selectivity see for example Dustmann and Rochina-Barrachina (2007).
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of the selection equation. The equation of interest is then augmented by the IMR and
is estimated using a fixed effects specification to eliminated unobserved
heterogeneity and potential correlation between unobserved individual specific
effects and observables characteristics. Wooldridge shows that the significance of the
coefficient associated to the Inverse Mills Ratio can be used to test the presence of
selection bias.
The advantage of using Wooldridge’s model over some approaches is that allows for
the unobserved individual effects in both equations to be correlated with the
observables (which are assumed to be exogenous). This approach does not require
knowledge of the distribution of the error term in the equation of interest, and allows
for time heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the error terms in both equations.
Normality of errors in the selection equation however is assumed. To allow for
unobserved individual eﬀects, itv in the selection equation to be possibly correlated
with the observable variables itX 2 , Wooldridge assumes that unobserved individual
eﬀects are a linear projection on the (within) means of the regressors. The
participation selection model for the both specifications is therefore rewritten as
following:
itiititit vZZXs  32212*  (9)
where itit Zv 2 has a normal distribution. The selection equation also includes iZ , a
time average of all time-varying regressors which captures the correlation with
observables.
The exclusion restrictions ( itZ 2 ) are variables that affect the probability of
participation but do not directly influence hourly earnings. The restrictions used in
most studies examining the employment selection issues involve family
characteristics such as the number and ages of children. However, because the focus
here is on individuals approaching retirement age, these instruments are less
appropriate since the presence of young children in the household is unlikely. For
this reason, the instruments used are non-labour income and three dummy variables.
The first is equal to one for those with health problems, the second is equal to one if
the individual lives with his spouse and the third dummy is equal to one if his
spouse is in employment. These are all likely to play a role in determining labour
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supply of older workers but should not have direct effects on potential hourly
earnings.
5.1 First stage results
The first step consists in estimating the selection equations for the both definitions of
participation : (a) employed or not and (b) declare annual earnings or not. In the
former case, non-employed include the unemployed (Tables 6 and 7). Both selection
equations contain three types of explanatory variable that affect the decisions to
participate in the labour market.
The first category includes time-varying regressors which in the current context are
time dummies and age. As a key determinant in the decision of retirement, the
decision to leave the labour market increases with age in the two specifications. The
second set of variables included in the selection equation consists of time-constant
regressors. The effects of these variables, which approximate the individual specific
effects, are strongly significant in both specifications. Average age has a negative
effect on participation (except for those who have worked during the last 12 months
but no longer do so). Average age which approximates the cohort effect indicates
that older cohorts (i.e. individual with a higher average age) have a higher
probability of entering in retirement than younger cohorts at a given age. Average
non labour income also has a strong negative effect on the probability of
participation.
The effects of education are significant except for ‘gcse’. Individuals with low levels
of education tend to participate more than individuals with higher education. The
coefficient for an individual with no qualifications is negative and significant at the
5% level. Individuals with no qualifications tend to continue working longer. College
or university educated individuals are more likely to retire than individuals with A
level at given age.
The final category of explanatory variables are variables representing the exclusion
restrictions (excluded from the wage equation). They are all strongly significant bar
one. The marital status variable is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the
individual is married or living with a partner and zero otherwise. The estimated
coefficient is negative but not significant. So living in a couple or not does not
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influence the probability of participating in the labour market per se. Whether the
spouse is employed or not affects the decision to participate, but does not directly
influence an individual’s hourly wage. The situation of the spouse is an exclusion
restriction variable because it captures the incentive of the individual to remain
employed while his spouse is employed. Not unexpectedly, having an income other
than labour income increases the probability of retirement. The health problems
dummy negatively affects the decision to participate. An individual who has health
problems is more likely with draw from the labour force than an individual in good
health. The coefficients are similar for the both specifications.
5.2 Second-stage results
The results of the second stage of the Wooldridge approach are presented in columns
2 of Tables 6 and 7. The coefficients associated with the Inverse Mills Ratio are
negative and not statistically different from zero in the both specifications. The null
hypothesis of no selection bias cannot be rejected in both cases. This means that the
unobserved factors that affect the participation decision do not influence the earnings
determining process. The age-earnings profile for the oldest workers is not different
from that for those aged 50 and the age dummies indicate that there is no evidence of
a decline in earnings.
We have found therefore that after taking into account the possibility of selection,
there is no evidence that the workers earnings decline at older age whichever
definition of hourly earnings used. The decline observed at end of career is not due
to a bias related to unobserved factors that influence decisions to leave the labour
force. This evidence is consistent with the results of Casanova (2012) who finds no
selection into retirement and suggests that the wage process for older workers is best
represented by a step function.
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6. Conclusions
Cross-section studies suggest that the age-earnings profile has a concave, inverted U
shape, which implies that older workers see their earnings decrease as a consequence
of ageing, as they approach retirement. In this paper we have explored a number of
possible explanations for the decline in hourly earnings observed for older workers
in cross section data. Using panel data for Great Britain, we find that this decline
does not appear to be due to age itself. Part of the phenomenon is due to cohort
effects: younger cohorts tend to earn more than their predecessors. However,
changes in labour market status late in life are also contributory factors. Changing
jobs, reducing hours of work and spending time unemployed in later life all lead to
lower earnings. There is no decline in earnings due to age for employees remaining
in employment with same employer. Altogether these results provide evidence that
on average the age-earnings profile remains flat at older age.
We have also investigated the role of selection on the decline inearnings. We found
that selection bias out of employment cannot explain the decline observed in the
cross section age-earnings profile. After controlling for selection, we do not find any
evidence of negative wage growth after the age 50. The inverted U-shape observed in
cross section data is not the typical earnings trajectory of a worker in the later years
of their working life. While this may be reassuring for policy-makers, changes in
labour market status late in life are found lead to earnings reductions. While there is
a voluntary, labour supply dimension in certain cases, our findings indicate that
involuntary separations in later life are associated with substantially lower hourly
earnings. Older workers who are laid-off may experience labour market
disadvantage in terms of finding jobs at a similar level, spending time in
unemployment and being forced to accept lower paid jobs. If earnings do decline at
older ages for certain individuals, it is the consequence of events which are linked to
age, rather than due to the process of ageing itself.
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Table 1: Cohort numbers by year (males)
Year
of
survey
Cohort (Birth year)
Total1931-35 1936-40 1941-45 1946-50 1951-55 1956-60 1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85
1991 267 306 378 437 409 497 469 404 440 0 0 3,261
1992 238 276 339 383 374 450 418 337 379 67 0 3,261
1993 219 252 308 356 340 409 389 316 350 137 0 3,076
1994 207 241 300 357 336 391 380 298 333 195 0 3,038
1995 198 231 281 343 314 369 367 280 314 244 0 2,941
1996 158 227 287 347 315 368 367 292 320 330 0 3,011
1997 111 220 278 334 311 361 360 279 303 317 63 2,937
1998 77 214 274 323 300 355 334 264 289 294 128 2,852
1999 33 207 268 313 296 341 331 258 272 280 178 2,777
2000 0 199 259 306 285 331 321 250 263 262 231 2,707
2001 0 156 250 290 274 329 313 241 263 239 281 2,636
2002 0 121 241 282 270 319 311 232 245 227 242 2,490
2003 0 74 236 279 265 310 287 227 226 218 232 2,354
2004 0 34 218 273 258 302 282 217 217 206 213 2,220
2005 0 0 217 265 251 290 266 202 213 196 206 2,106
2006 0 0 173 255 242 283 268 198 210 190 195 2,014
2007 0 0 119 247 232 268 253 194 203 173 176 1,865
Table 2: Summary statistics by cohort group (males)
Variable
Cohort (Birth year)
1931-35 1936-40 1941-45 1946-50 1951-55 1956-60 1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85
Age 60.6 57.9 54.9 50.4 45.3 40.2 35.2 30.1 24.8 21.6 19.6
(0.058) (0.069) (0.073) (0.069) (0.071) (0.066) (0.067) (0.075) (0.072) (0.067) (0.058)
Married 0.860 0.857 0.863 0.848 0.786 0.842 0.757 0.643 0.367 0.198 0.086
(0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
University/ 0. 062 0.074 0.110 0.127 0.156 0.200 0.162 0.193 0.124 0.119 0.067
college (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
A level 0.244 0.347 0. 425 0. 418 0. 495 0. 431 0. 441 0. 462 0. 475 0. 419 0. 364
(0.011) (0.009) (0, 007) (0, 006) (0, 007) (0, 006) (0, 006) (0, 007) (0, 007) (0, 008) (0, 010)
Gcse 0.113 0.147 0.116 0.173 0.122 0.163 0.193 0.179 0.232 0.273 0.258
(0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
No qualification 0.566 0.428 0.343 0.278 0.218 0.202 0.193 0.150 0.156 0.130 0.226
(0.013) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009)
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Table 3: Pooled earnings regression
(1) (2) (3)
log Real usual
hourly wage
log Real current
hourly wage
log Real hourly
wage derived
from annual
labour income
age≥52 -0.0239 -0.0256 -0.0213
[0.0187] [0.0206] [0.0211]
age≥54 -0.00367 -0.0222 -0.0118
[0.0200] [0.0221] [0.0238]
age≥56 -0.0367 -0.0183 -0.0212
[0.0216] [0.0238] [0.0266]
age≥58 -0.0466** -0.0479* -0.0747**
[0.0235] [0.0256] [0.0369]
age≥60 -0.104*** -0.0985*** -0.0559
[0.0265] [0.0306] [0.0386]
age≥62 -0.0684** -0.0825** -0.0710**
[0.0271] [0.0316] [0.0290]
Observations 6335 5392 6387
Adjusted R2 0.172 0.169 0.105
Note: In addition to variables shown, an intercept and controls for education, marital status, origins, and years
were included in all specifications.
Standard errors, in brackets, are corrected for clustering * indicates significance at 10%, ** 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table 4: Fixed effects estimates of earnings equations
Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3)
log Real usual
hourly wage
log Real current
hourly wage
log Real hourly wage
derived from annual
labour income
age≥52 0.003 0.002 -0.002
(0.015) (0.017) (0.016)
age≥54 0.029* 0.007 0.004
(0.016) (0.018) (0.016)
age≥56 0.013 0.016 0.012
(0.015) (0.016) (0.018)
age≥58 -0.000 0.004 -0.025
(0.018) (0.017) (0.026)
age≥60 -0.037** -0.047** 0.004
(0.019) (0.022) (0.035)
age≥62 -0.019 -0.032 -0.063**
(0.020) (0.023) (0.029)
Observations 6323 5381 6377
R2 0.021 0.020 0.014
Note: Time dummies included.
Standard errors, in brackets, are corrected for clustering,* indicates significance at 10%, ** 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table 5: Movers and stayers
Dependent variable Log Usual hourly wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All
workers
‘Continuous’
workers
‘Stayers’ ‘Movers’7 ‘Movers’8 ‘Partially
retired’
age≥52 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.008 0.005 0.008
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
age≥54 0.029* 0.038** 0.031** 0.029* 0.031** 0.032**
(0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
age≥56 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.012
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
age≥58 -0.000 -0.024 -0.004 0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
age≥60 -0.037** -0.008 -0.035* -0.036** -0.035* -0.024
(0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
age≥62 -0.019 -0.010 -0.018 -0.024 -0.021 -0.019
(0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
tenure 0.006***
(0.001)
voluntary
mobility
-0.098*** -0.089***
(0.021) (0.021)
involuntary
mobility
-0.252*** -0.010**
(0.041) (0.003)
partially
retired
-0.231***
(0.061)
Observations 6323 4010 6323 6323 6323 5754
Adjusted R² 0.021 0.035 0.039 0.051 0.033 0.039
Note: Standard errors, in brackets, are corrected for clustering * indicates significance at 10%, ** 5%, *** at 1%.
All regressions include time dummies
7 Involuntary mobility defined as a dummy variable
8 Involuntary mobility defined as the length of unemployment spell (in months) prior to current job
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Table 6: Wooldridge approach based on usual hourly wages
(1) Pooled Probit (2)Fixed Effects
participation Usual hourly wage
Time-Varying Regressors
age≥52 -0.026 0.002
(0.074) (0.015)
age≥54 -0.114 0.030*
(0.072) (0.016)
age≥56 -0.176** 0.016
(0.067) (0.015)
age≥58 -0.205** 0.004
(0.064) (0.018)
age≥60 -0.304*** -0.027
(0.062) (0.019)
age≥62 -0.303*** -0.007
(0.057) (0.022)
married -0.007
(0.047)
Lambda -0.068
(0.046)
Time-Constant Regressors
average age -0.026*
(0.014)
average non-labour income -0.274***
(0.020)
education=college/university -0.165**
(0.055)
education= gcse 0.007
(0.055)
education= no qualification -0.076**
(0.039)
Exclusion Restrictions
non labour income -0.162***
(0.014)
health limit -0.195***
(0.034)
partner employed 0.578***
(0.037)
Constant 1.984** 2.378***
(0.719) (0.069)
Observations 8966 6323
Adjusted R² 0.2805 0.0217
Note: Standard errors, in brackets, are corrected for clustering
* p < 0.1,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
All regressions include time dummies
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Table 7: Wooldridge approach. Annual hourly wage
(1) Pooled Probit (2) Fixed Effects
participation Annual hourly wage
Time-Varying Regressors
age≥52 -0.090 -0.001
(0.070) (0.016)
age≥54 -0.065 0.004
(0.068) (0.016)
age≥56 -0.154** 0.015
(0.064) (0.018)
age≥58 -0.194** -0.020
(0.062) (0.027)
age≥60 -0.315*** 0.015
(0.060) (0.032)
age≥62 -0.326*** -0.050
(0.056) (0.030)
married -0.040
(0.046)
Lambda -0.068
(0.067)
Time-Constant Regressors
average age -0.019
(0.013)
average non-labour income -0.238***
(0.019)
education=college/university -0.215***
(0.053)
education= gcse 0.062
(0.053)
education= no qualification -0.034
(0.038)
Exclusion Restrictions
non labour income -0.150***
(0.012)
health limit -0.184***
(0.033)
partner employed 0.503***
(0.036)
Constant 1.632** 2.365***
(0.685) (0.102)
Observations 8966 6377
Adjusted R² 0.2503 0.0144
Note: Standard errors, in brackets, are corrected for clustering
* p < 0.1,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
All regressions include time dummies
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Figure 2 Participation rates by age and by cohort (males)
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Figure 3 Cross section age-hourly earnings profiles
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Figure 4 Cross section age-annual earnings profiles
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Figure 5a Cohort-specific age-hourly earnings profiles 1991-2007
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Figure 5b Cohort-specific age-hourly earnings profiles 1991-2007
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